cal and cultural developments challenge the capacity of the nation-state to function in relative autonomy. The expansion and acceleration of cultural, political and economic activities cutting across national and regional borders is not inherently incompatible with democratic practice. And the nation-state shows no signs of disappearing completely.' Yet as the nation-state experiences a diminished capacity for independent action and the stable reproduction of collective identities, its status as the preeminent site of democratic government comes into question.
As a result, approaches to the concept of democratic governance beyond the nation-state have gained wide attention. Most prominently, the works of David Held and Daniele Archibugi come to mind. 2 And notably, Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls have each presented extended thoughts on the prospects of transnational governance and cosmopolitan law. 3 For some, the proper political response to globalization is the consolidation of democracy at the nationallevel-"-<l strengthening of the nation-state in the face of pressures from abroad. 4 But for many, the opposite is required: while strong democratic procedures at the domestic level remain important, democratic government, it is argued, can only be maintained in the current context by extending its borders outward, beyond the nation-state. For example, David Held envisions the consolidation of a system of cosmopolitan law that would one-day cover the globe, providing the legal structure for a truly transnational democratic politics. 5 Still others see the future of global governance as taking form in a process of decentralization, or "disaggregation." Processes of rule-making are increasingly dispersed along a multiplicity of networks on a variety of levels of political, economic, and cultural organization; thus, according to this view, political systems must come to transverse the boundaries of the local and the global, the public and the private. 6 For Habermas, however, the challenges of globalization call for the re-aggregation of political authority at a level that goes beyond the national frame but pulls up short of the global. In "the Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy," Habermas argues that a democratic regionalism represented by the continuing project of the European Union could provide the necessary infrastructure for the democratic coordination of processes of globalization in the absence of a global government. 7 This paper will interrogate both dimensions of Habermas' s formulation. What is the status of the "postnational" in Habermas's model for a regional polity? And to what extent can it serve as a general model for the form of democratic practice beyond the nation-state? In the context of globalization can the postnational polity indeed represent "the future of democracy?" Part I will examine the challenges posed by globalization to the modern nationstate, arguing that the challenges are substantial and do in fact merit a reexamination of the forms of democratic practice. Part II will address the project of regionalism as one such political response, indicating the challenges presented by political integration on the regional scale. Clearly, large regional political organizations must transcend ties between central state authority and ethno-national belonging. In this sense they must be "postnational." However, I will suggest that European democratic integration as described by Habermas maintains elements of an extended civic-nationalism; political solidarity in the postnational polity is premised upon a territorially based political identity situated in a shared history; and in this sense it does not transcend the national model completely. Part III will explore how. this affects the model's claim to represent a general form of democratic practice beyond the nation-state, and it will examine the tensions thus revealed between the particular contexts of democratic legitimacy and the broader project of cosmopolitan global governance.
and events in one region of the globe may have transcontinental effects potentially reaching the far corners of the earth. This is a process with a long history that has accelerated in recent years due in part to the end of the Cold War and the revolution in information technologies, including the rise of satellite communications and the World Wide Web. Yet the concept of globalization should not be understood as inherently implying the inevitable integration of the planet into a single world society. Globalization is an uneven process, benefiting some more than others and creating divisions as surely as it makes connections. Globalization is fundamentally a contested concept, its ultimate character and direction a matter of dispute.
David Held and Anthony McGrew have depicted recent debates over globalization as divided among three general positions: the hyperglobalist, the skeptic, and the transformationalist. Briefly, the hyper globalist understands contemporary globalization as heralding a new epoch of human history driven by the free movement of global capital and characterized by the inevitable rise of a world civilization that will result in the end of the nation-state. The skeptic, on the other hand, argues that this understanding of globalization is greatly exaggerated. Focussing on economic factors, the skeptic argues that there is nothing unprecedented about current levels of national interdependence, and that nation-states continue to be and will remain the primary political and economic actors in international affairs for the foreseeable future. In contrast, the transformationalist understands the current epoch as one of unprecedented change. But unlike the hyperglobalist, the transformationalist argues that the direction of this process remains uncertain and in contest. The transformationalist disputes the claim that the sovereign state is a thing of the past, but also challenges the claim that states remain as strong as ever. He argues rather that globalization transform!> the relationship between states, markets, sovereignty, and the transnational sphere. It challenges the governing and legitimation capacities of old political arrangements, domestically and internationally. And it thus adds new incentives to the search for political innovation. lo
In the context of this debate Habermas may be understood as a transformationalist. Globalization, Habermas asserts, "describe[s) a process, not an end-state" (PC 66). He agrees that something new is certainly happening; and while such developments are neither inevitable nor necessarily incompatible with democratic practice per se, they do, he argues, challenge the nation-state as democracy's dominant institutional form (PC 67).
Habermas defines the modern democratic nation-state by four basic characteristics: First, it is formed by an administrative system constituted by positive law (PC 63) . The origins of the nation-state in Europe lie in the development of systems of administrative power that were well established long before they were brought under democratic control. Second, this administrative system is defined territorially. An effective system of positive law must have a clear object of control; territorial boundaries serve to define the law's "sphere of validity," and identify the population from which the relevant political community will form. Territoriality serves as the focus of the principle of state sovereignty, understood as the state's external autonomy from foreign powers and its internal monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, or the capacity to maintain "law and order" (PC 64).
Third, the development of the administrative state into a modern democratic nation-state depends upon the constitution of national identity. "Only the symbolic construction of 'a people' makes the modern state into a nation-state" (PC 64). National consciousness provides the solidarity that transforms a disparate population into a body of citizens involved in the common practice of democratic selfdetermination. And fourth, the legitimacy of the modern democratic state is characterized by the progressive development of civil, political, and social rights. Basic to effective democratic practice, civil and political rights constitute the spheres of private and public autonomy. And in the context of social inequality in capitalist society, social rights become necessary to secure the very conditions for the equal exercise of civil and political rights.
Globalization challenges the nation-state in each of its four basic components: It is challenged I) in its administrative effectiveness, 2) in its territorial sovereignty, 3) in its collective identity, and 4) in its democratic legitimacy. First, economic globalization puts fiscal pressure on nation-states. As new information technology and neo-liberal trade policy make far-flung markets more interconnected, national economies become increasingly interdependent. The acceleration of such connections, augmented by the decline of capital controls, and promoted by international institutions, has contributed to an intemational atmosphere that puts strong fiscal pressure on nation-states to practice extreme monetary austerity, avoiding capital flight, but diminishing state resources for the effective administration of services. In this manner globalization in the form of neo-liberal economic policy poses a serious threat to the capacity of the nation-state to provide for the welfare and protection of its people. II Second, as states and economies become increasingly interdependent, more political decisions are made with transnational effects, calling into question the assumption that relevant political constituencies are solely defined within national borders. Beyond the borders of the nation-state, other influential borders emerge, increasingly salient-e.g. borders of international collective security arrangements, or regional free trade zones and other economic networks (PC 70). The proliferation of international decision-making bodies tends to extend the sphere of authority beyond the nation-state. The consolidation of the WTO, for example, signifies the appearance of an international institution with the authority to overrule national governments. Whereas international law was once understood to lie between states, over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, it has aspired to rise above them.12
Third, globalization puts pressure on national identity in at least two opposed directions: it inspires reactionary movements, "hardening" nationalist or sectarian sentiments as people feel their identities challenged by confrontations with other peoples and cultures. And it can "soften" national identities as "McWorld," the infectious homogenizing material culture of neo-Iiberal capitalism, spreads over the globe (PC 72-73).13 That these processes occur simultaneously reflects the 'dialectical' character of globalization. 14 While distant localities are interconnected in new ways, creating for the first time a truly global web of social relations, the effects of such connections remain unpredictable and often tension-filled. Indeed, the result of transnational interconnection is often the reassertion of local practices and identities asserting the right to stand apart. James Rosenau calls this "fragmegration"-the simultaneous integration and fragmentation of social relations. IS Finally, as an effect of all of the above, Habermas argues, the democratic legitimacy of the nation-state is challenged. As the sphere of democratic politics remains restricted to the domain of the nation-state, the influence of transnational markets limits the capacity of governments to regulate their economies, thus inhibiting the collective capacity for self-determination. Transnational actors, unaccountable to domestic constituencies, make decisions producing profound effects on the national level. Mechanisms of decision-making shift out of the reach of democratic procedures, and the logic of the market supercedes politics. 16 As the nation-state becomes increasingly beholden to transnational capital, the effective institution of social policy is diminished, undermining the state's capacity to secure the basic conditions for the equal opportunity of democratic practice, contributing to the sense that globalization undermines democracy at home while augmenting the influence of actors abroad.
As a result, Habermas argues, democratic politics must seek ways to respond. regional borders with increasing facility. As a result, if democratic practice is to remain viable it must not limit itself to the frame of the nation-state. The container has been breached, and democratic practice must seek new forms or risk being overcome.
The history of modernization reflects the extension of new networks of functional integration challenging the coordination capacities of societies, confronting them with new horizons, and precipitating social and political crises. Historically, such crises are generally followed by a renewed closure characterized by new modes of social integration. Thus, Habermas argues, the project at hand becomes the constitution of a new political-institutional enclosure by which the democratic capacity for making collectively binding decisions could be extended to the transnational sphere. Habermas offers a theory of a democratized European Union as a model for such a new political framework. He argues that as a postnational polity, the EU would transcend the national frame in the interest of regaining the regulatory and steering capacities currently being lost by the nation-state. And he offers ' the postnational model as a starting point for a new democratic international order.
II. The Postnational Polity

Regionalism
If under conditions of globalization the state has begun to lose its capacity to protect its people from the exigencies of the world economy, and if processes of globalization have left influential forces beyond the steering capacities of the democratic nation-state, then political change is clearly on the agenda. The integration of separate nation-states into new political and economic units is seen as one way to respond to this new conjuncture. Habermas's version of the postnational constellation presents a form of regionalism as an attempt to demonstrate how democratic politics might be reconfigured to regain some of its regulatory and steering capacity vis-a-vis transnational economic and political actors. Regionalism is thus understood as a political project that goes beyond the evolutionary integration of a geographical unit. It is a response to a political and economic context that can be generalized to represent a normative project for the articulation of a new global order.
For the discussion that follows it will be helpful to make some distinctions regarding the concept of regionalism and the regional polity. First of all, in speaking about a region in the context of globalization I will primarily be concerned with "macroregions," regions that today comprise more than one nation-state, as opposed to micro-or sub-state regions-e.g., South East Asia as opposed to the American Southwest, the Andes rather than Catalonia. Second, it is important to distinguish between Cold War strategic regionalism constructed by exogenous hegemonic powers-such as the case of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization)-and what Bjorn Hettne calls the "new regionalism," endogenous projects of regional political and economic integration-most notably the recent stages in the consolidation of the EUP Clearly the Habermasian project falls under the latter, "new regionalism."
My primary focus concerns the following question: Habermas seeks to retrieve the collective capacity to make legitimately binding decisions to democratically steer the course of society; doing so on the regional level presupposes social integration beyond the nation-state; thus, according to Habermas, what provides the basis of solidarity in the regional polity? In what follows, I will argue that while Habermas does provide a model for a post-ethno-national polity, he remains tied to a civic-national frame on the regional level, or rather he provides us with a model of an "extended nationalism."IB Understanding the model in this way has consequences for its applicability beyond the European case, and helps to illuminate some of the substantial obstacles to the founding of a cosmopolitan democratic world order in the context of globalization.
Discourse Theory and Regional Democracy
The idea of a functioning democratic polity uniting all of Europe is indeed daunting. However, understood in the model of deliberative democracy, Habermas argues, there is no reason that the constitution of democratic legitimacy beyond the plane of the nation-state should be inconceivable. In Habermas's discourse model of democracy, democratic will-formation is understood not primarily in the exercise of political freedom through direct participation, but more importantly in the use of public reason (PC I 10). Most important is not the expressed will of the people per se, but the extent, quality, and accessibility of networks of communication where political opinions are debated and political wills are formed. 19 Given modern communication technology and mass media, Habermas argues there are no insurmountable structural barriers to conceiving the functioning of such networks in an expanded territory such as the European Union.
Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy stems from his previous work on communicative action, discourse ethics, and the formal pragmatics of languageuse, in combination with his philosophical reflections on the medium of law as such.2o According to Habermas, inherent to the "conditions of communicative asso-ciation in general"21 is the discourse principle (D) that states "just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses. "22 Democracy for Habermas is the combination of the discourse principle and the legal form, where (D) logically implies a general daim to political autonomy, and the legal medium alone presupposes a general daim to the right to personal liberty. 23 Habermas's discourse theory of democracy thus draws upon both republican . and liberal understandings of democratic legitimacy. It seeks to reconcile the historical tension between popular sovereignty and human rights, between the republican freedom of collective self-government, and the liberal freedom of individual privacy and limited government. For Habermas, human rights do not limit the exercise of popular sovereignty but rather provide its condition of possibility. Human rights do not restrain the political power of popular sovereignty but rather enable it. Public participation in the collective self-organization of society is a central feature of democratic legitimation, but effective participation is possible only in the context of a system that secures the basic rights of public and private autonomy necessary for the legitimate regulation of a common social life by means of positive law.24 Similarly, rights are not effectively prior to or independent of the exercise of popular sovereignty: In order for rights to gain the specificity necessary for their effective implementation, they must be articulated and justified publidy. Thus for Habermas, popular sovereignty and human rights mutually pre-suppose one another. 25 They are in effect "co-original." 26 Habermas argues popular sovereignty need not refer to a specific collective will or to a concrete sovereign body ruling itself directly. Rather, it may refer to the "general accessibility of a deliberative process whose structure grounds expectation for rationally acceptable results. "27 This does not abandon the participatory impulse of popular sovereignty, but re-interprets it intersubjectively. It relocates it to the free debates and deliberations of public opinion and public assembly, of informal gathering and official parliament. For Habermas, popular sovereignty no longer signifies the body of the people standing in for the deposed monarch, but defines the normative basis and "formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of those discursive processes ... in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a binding character."28It identifies the general principles that structure the procedures by which the people can freely formulate opinions and express their will-such as rights to equal participation and due process-and it guides the institutionalization of the conditions in which democratic will-formation is made possible. In this way the discourse theory of democracy seeks to provide a critical standard by which to evaluate institutional orders claiming to partake in the normativity of the democratic tradition.
Applying the standard of Habermasian deliberative democracy to the regional polity presents extraordinary institutional and social challenges. First, it clearly necessitates the constitution of transnational political institutions that could be responsive to the communicative power of an extremely diverse European civil society.29 And second, in its focus on the intersubjectivity of popular sovereignty and the' role of the public sphere, it further reveals the structural dependence of democratic practice upon forms of social solidarity. The pursuit of common citizenship and the cultivation of a sense of collectivity thus remain vital to the success of the democratic polity even at the transnational level.
Clearly the treaty basis of the E.U. must be re-articulated into a type of Constitution that establishes the foundations of democratic citizenship and representation, cultivating a more democratic transnational decision-making procedure, complete with direct elections of representatives to the European Parliament, as indeed recommended by the European Convention in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, June 2003. 30 In addition, according to Habermas, regional democratization will require the development of transnational political parties, along with increased avenues for the proliferation of informal political debate on a transnational scale. While political debates will continue to be largely located within national publics, the development of a continental public sphere will be essential to the development of democratic practice at the supra-national level (PC 100-103).31 31. It remains to be seen whether the absence of a common language among Europeans may present an obstacle to the formation of a truly transnational public sphere. Habermas suggests that national To be successful in the long run, Europeans will have to understand themselves as participants in a collective project that transcends national borders; former competitors will need to become fellow citizens. As the Preamble to the draft Constitution states, Europeans must be "determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny .... "32 Yet this assumes the presence of a common source of integration uniting an extremely diverse population. According to the discourse theory of democracy, this should not necessarily present a problem, for solidarity may develop in the course of "a practice of selflegislation that includes all citizens equally" (PC 73). To the extent that people from a variety of backgrounds may understand themselves to be both the authors and the subjects of the law within the same polity, a common ethno-cultural identity is unnecessary for democratic practice. A homogenous collective identity becomes unnecessary "to the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinionand will-formation make a reasonable political understanding possible, even among strangers" (PC 73). And thus, with political reform, solidarity on the regional level of Europe is, Habermas argues, certainly within the realm of possibility.
Habermas invites us to understand this form of regional solidarity as postnational; it clearly seeks to transcend the long-standing ethnic or linguistic divisions of Europe: the French and Germans, the Spanish and British all to share a common citizenship. However, it must be asked whether democratic institutional reform is the only prerequisite for cultivating a post-national or transnational common citizenship? As Habermas has noted, the relationship between nationalism and modern democratic practice has long been intertwined. Thus history would suggest it could not be as simple as substituting democratic identity for national identity.
Nationalism and Politicaiintegration
As a member of the first generation of post-war German intellectuals seeking to overcome the catastrophe of Nazism, Habermas is keenly suspicious of any links between ethnicity and citizenship.33 However, he recognizes the historic function this link has played in providing the requisite principle of integration necessary to the rise of popular sovereignty. The history of the liberal democratic nation-state is education systems would in fact have to provide Ihe basis for such a common language, most likely English (PC 103). However, the reliance on a second or third language raises Ihe concern that pOSlnational democratic pOlitics would be dominated by an elite agenda. As Will Kymlicka has said, democracy is "pol- characterized by a tension between civic-republicanism and nationalism, and according to Habermas, the fate of democracy depends upon which tendency predominates. 34 Civic-republicanism demarcates political membership according to a legal definition of citizenship that emphasizes universal legal equality. On the other hand, nationalism understands the political community to be constituted by a particular cultural identity that is pre-political or given "independent of and prior to the political opinion or the will-formation of the citizens themselves."35 At the close of the eighteenth century, republicanism allied with nationalism in order to advance democratic citizenship as the integrating principle of the state. However, democratization becomes threatened whenever ethnic nationalism encroaches upon the political sphere claiming to be the primary integrative force independent of republican political practice. 36 According to Habermas, this tension can be resolved only "as long as a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation of citizens is accorded priority over an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation."37 Democratic citizenship thus articulates more than a legal status for Habermas; it provides the foundation of a shared political culture that can serve the purpose of integration often provided for by ethnocentric nationalism. In order for the democratic integration of a regional polity to be successful it must be able to cultivate a common political culture among an extremely diverse array of peoples. Habermas argues that in a liberal democratic nation-state political culture may arise from a rational consensus over the general principles of legitimate democratic practice. Basic constitutional rights and principles can serve as a "fixed point of reference" around which a '''constitutional patriotism' may develop, politically integrating people from a variety of world-views."38 These basic rights and principles stand apart from the level of subcultures and prepolitical identities to the extent that the legal definition of citizenship is based upon the notion of universal equality before the law. There is no conceptual reason why this could not ultimately take place on a continental level.
However, while the principles of universal legal equality may transcend national divisions in a regional polity, to become operational they must be situated within a particular historical context. According to Habermas, in a complex, multicultural, value-pluralist world, basic political rights and principles pertain to those that" ... citizens must confer on one another if they want to legitimately regulate their interactions and life contexts by means of positive law."39 However, the basic 34. Habermas categories of positive and negative rights (free speech, assembly, etc.) are in Habermas's terms, "unsaturated"; they are not infused with the concerns of particular historical, political or social contexts. And, as a result, they can not become the "driving force" behind the project of democratic political integration "until they are situated in the historical context of the history of a nation of citizens .... "40 This applies equally to the project of regional democratic integration. Writing on the need for a European constitution, Habermas argues what is needed is not simply abstract allegiance to broad principles but "interest in and affective attachment to a particular ethos: in other words, the attraction of a specific way of life. "41 Regional political integration thus depends not only on a shared commitment to the values of liberal democratic practice but on a shared historical experience which may provide a common backdrop for the interpretation of basic constitutional principles and to a specific shared way of life. Sharing the values of liberal democratic practice is not the same as sharing a "specific way of life." American society is clearly committed to liberal democracy, but there are sharp distinctions between the broadly speaking American and the broadly speaking European ethos. And I would argue such distinctions, not least the European concern for social rights, are foremost in many Europeans' minds, including that of Habermas. A central concern for Habermas is to reframe social policy in the wake of neo-liberalism's attack on the European Welfare State, the goal being to articulate a viable alternative to the so-called "Washington Consensus." 42 Habermas argues that the nations of Europe already share a certain historical horizon based in the shared experiences of modernization and violent upheaval. After centuries of conflict-between religions and between nations-culminating in two disastrous international wars in "the age of extremes,"43 Europe has come to share a common tendency toward toleration, "the overcoming of particularisms ... and the institutionalization of disputes" (PC 103). It is not only that the European nations share a geographic and thus historical contiguity, but that, according to Habermas, they have lived a shared history that particularly prepares them for regional political integration. 44 The experiences of European history "have shaped the normative self-understanding of European modernity into an egalitarian universalism that can ease the transition to postnational democracy's demanding contexts of mutual recognition ... " .
(pC 103). According to Habermas, the course of European history reflects a process of modernization that forms a common value horizon, providing the shared context for the interpretation and application of basic constitutional rights and principles, making possible the development of a common political culture across the diverse peoples of Europe. Regional political integration requires an expansion of civil solidarity beyond the nation-state; and the basis of this solidarity is a shared political culture that can only succeed within the common horizon of a shared course of history and a sense of common fate. While regional political integration does not require homogenization-Europe will never be a "melting potU-it does require the cultivation of a regional political identity that "goes beyond mere legal c1assification."45 According to Habermas's own terms, European political integration depends upon a territorially based political identity situated in a shared history. In the sense that the shared history occurs on the regional level and entails solidarity among a variety of ethnic groups, it is understood as post-national. Yet one could equally discuss this in terms of an "extended nationalism," or a regional civic-nationalism. 46 Habermas tends to equate nationalism with ethnonationalismY Yet "constitutional patriotism" in another manner of speaking is the civic-nationalism inspired by the principles of liberal-democracy at work in a multi-cultural polity. While ethnonationalism places the basis for political membership in a collective identity existentially prior to state institutions, civic-nationalism understands the origins of political membership intertwined with political institutions. In the midst of the French Revolution, Abbe Sieyes defined the nation as a "body of associates living under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly."48 The nation is composed of citizens, equal before the law without reference to pre-political ethnic identity.
This portrait of the nation is quite compatible with the political culture of Habermas's regional polity.49 A democratized European Union would be animated by a 49. In this sense it is important to note that I do not equate the ethnic/civic nationalism divide to be one between culture and reason, or between inheritance and choice, such as in Michaellgnatieff's Blood and Belonging (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993). Rather as stated I understand the distinction as one between pre political identity and identity inseparable from pOlitical and legal institutions. Habermas is j I I Adam LupeJ 167 spirit of "extended nationalism" in that its integration would depend upon a territorially based political identity, situated in a shared history, and cultivated by the constitution of a political process that enabled a continental collective capacity to make legitimately binding decisions.
Understanding democratic regionalism as a form of extended nationalism has implications for its potential to embody "the future of democracy" as promised. It raises questions concerning both the potential application of the model beyond Europe and its compatibility with the project of constituting a broader democratic world order. The specific form of democratic regional integration arises from the particular constellation of historical processes experienced in any given region. While the basic principles of liberal democratic governance may be the same across regions, their interpretation and institutional application remains situated in the particular historical horizons of a specific context. Thus one may expect the form of prospective regional polities to differ across regions. In what follows I will argue that while Habermas makes a strong case for the possibility of a post-nation-state European democracy, the model's generality as the "initial form" of a democratic response to globalization is ultimately less convincing.
III. The Future of Democracy?
The European Union remains easily the most developed form of regional integration in the world, and it will continue to be so far into the foreseeable future. Thus it is logical that scholars turn to it to analyze regionalism's general feasibility as a form of economic and political organization. Habermas presents his model of the postnational polity not simply as an argument for the democratization of the European Union, but as an attempt to understand how democratic practice might in general remain effective beyond the frame of the nation-state in the context of globalization .
. This approach leads to the following questions: First, is regionalism as a political project an adequate response to the challenges presented by globalization? More specifically, could a democratized EU indeed compensate for the lost competency of the nation-state? Second, does Habermas provide a general model as suggested-"the initial form" of the "future of democracy"-or is the form of his regional polity specific to Europe and not generally applicable to other regions in the world? And third, what is the relation between Habermas's regional model and the larger project of advancing a more democratic world order in the context of globalization? How does understanding the regional polity as an 'extended-nation' complicate the relation between the particular contexts of democratic legitimacy and the universalism of a cosmopolitan world order?
clear that "constitutional patriotism" includes a dimension of culture or shared way of life. See also Kym· Iicka. Politics in the Vernacular. 41. note 3.
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
The Capacity of a Regional Polity
In economic terms, a successfully integrated European Union would certainly be strong enough to insulate itself from the risks of capital flight and fluctuations in the global market, so devastating to smaller nation-state economies. For example, Habermas argues that vibrant intra-regional trade and direct investment in Europe would make the pursuit of strong social policies by the EU possible if the political will indeed existed. But if the potential effectiveness of a regional polity is greatly to be measured by the strength of its balance street, could such a model serve to redress the general inequities of the neo-liberal global economy? Or would it simply be yet another tool--cost prohibitive to most-to improve a developed region's competitive position in the transnational order, leaving the general architecture of the global political economy untouched? A world order dominated by self-sufficient regional blocs would risk devolving into a "neo-mercantilism"5o in which protectionist rich region-states compete over access to the cheap materials and labor of the developing world.
However, Habermas recognizes that "the creation of larger political unities in itself changes nothing about the mode of locational competition as such ... " (PC 104). A regionalism of self-sufficient inward looking "extended nationalisms" could easily slip into a system of defensive alliances, dividing the world into competitive blocs. But such a scenario would not take into account the important ways in which economic regionalization serves not simply as a bulwark against globalization but as a mediating, complementary process. 51 The speed, complexity, and flexibility of economic activity in the context of globalization means that simply expanding the territorial unit from nation-state to region-state is not sufficient to encompass the economic and political phenomena of the twenty-first century. As Manuel Castells has observed, many of the most significant social and economic practices of our time take place via networks that transcend the necessity of territorial contiguity. Multi-national corporations spread their production processes across the globe, and brokers in New York trade in London and Tokyo.52
The idea of a democratic regionalism is not to establish a viable "fortress" closed off from the rest of the world, but rather to constitute a democratically governed polity with the capacity to act effectively in the transnational sphere. The constitution of such regional polities could represent a necessary step in reinvigorating the political capacity to regulate markets, and to protect labor from the exigencies of the global economy. And at the very least an economically vigorous, politically coher~ ent and democratic European Union could serve as a check on American hege- But in order to be effective, regional polities must be theorized in relation to a broader transnational order. The constitution of the regional polity seeks to regain democratic regulatory and steering capacities at the transnational level. Regional polities, according to Habermas, could effectively take part in an "international negotiations system" which would seek to politically influence the global economic order. [n cooperation with international organizations and global civil society actors, cosmopolitan regional polities could represent "at least a prospect for a world domestic policy without a world government" (PC 109-10). That is to say, supranational regimes could with time become vital contributors to a transnational commitment to social justice within a decentralized cosmopolitan order. However, to be effective, the system would have to be characterized by a network of like-minded regional polities ani-_ mated by a cosmopolitan commitment to transnational law-needless to say, not an easy achievement. Thus, at the very least, it remains important to consider whether Habermas's model of the post-nation-state democracy is applicable beyond the European case and into the cosmopolitan sphere.
Alternative Paths to Regionalism
Habermas's model of the regional polity clearly aspires to relevance beyond the European context, but he justifies it in particularly European terms. European history has developed along a path that particularly prepares it for the postnational moment: "The learning process that can lead toward European civil solidarity encompasses a series of specifically European experiences" (PC 103, emphasis added). If, according to Habermas, the postnational polity develops out of a specific European experience, how are we to understand the project of democratic regionalism in other parts of the world? Have the histories of other parts of the world, such as Pacific Asia or the Andes, developed along broadly similar lines? Clearly Europe is the furthest along on the path to regional integration, but are other regions simply at earlier stages or are they on different paths altogether? While Habermas's normative discourse theory of democracy has applications beyond the European sphere, clearly there are substantial differences among the regions of the world that would seem to prevent any simple correspondence between the European experience and other regional projects.
If, for Habermas, the signature event of democratic regionalism in Europe has been the gradual "overcoming of particularisms" -or the triumph over religious and ethnonational chauvinism-faced with obstacles of a different sort, what form might regionalism take elsewhere? How might different political constellations effect the development of alternative forms of democratic regionalism? For example, the nation-states of the Andean Pact have always shared a common religion; and they have never defined nationality by ethnicity; and yet, the exclusion and exploitation of indigenous populations has been an integral part of the region's complex history.
Recognizing and redressing the special tragic history of indigenous groups in the region could result in the establishment of a regime of group rights in any future Andean democratic regionalism. For example, Colombia incorporated special representation rights for indigenous groups into its new constitution of 1991. And indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia have recently made special claims on the state regarding agrarian reform and local autonomy. 53 In fact, the most recent wave of democratization in Latin America has experienced a concomitant rise in ethnicbased movements in all of the countries with large indigenous populations with the exception of Peru. 54 Thus, pace Habermas, in some regions, achieving the postnational polity may require accepting that, at times, democratic progress means the recognition of ethnic specificity, not necessarily its transcendence.
Further afield, Peter Katzenstein has recently noted the differences between the processes of regionalism in Asia and in Europe. Whereas European regionalism is based on a Weberian framework of "legal state integration," regionalization in the Asian Pacific tends to be organized around "ethnic market capitalism."55 The European Union, as is well known, has developed through a series of multi-lateral interstate treaties. Yet while economists legitimately speak of a Pacific Asian economy, there are no treaty-based Pacific Asia-wide trade barriers or investment policies. 56 Economic regionalization in Asia depends less on inter-state agreements and more on business networks that seek out comparative advantage and the benefits of ethnic solidarity. Japanese companies export production processes throughout the region. And the large body of "Overseas Chinese" living throughout South East Asia and Indonesia maintain a vast web of economic relations based on kinship and ethnicity, establishing finance, trade and production networks that transcend state bordersY Thus in comparison to Europe, Asian nations are not simply at an earlier stage on the path to an EU style of regional integration; rather, they are on a different path altogether.
The framework of an inter-state treaty-based process of legal-state integration in Europe arises out of a strong Weberian state tradition. Weber famously defined the state as a political order whose "administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in enforcement of its order."58 And further: a modem state "possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by practical feasibility of a comprehensive World State. 62 He argues that an international system composed of regional polities, global civil society actors, and international organizations such as the UN would be preferable and more likely to succeed than a more comprehensive and integrated cosmopolitan democracy like the one proposed by David Held. 63 Habermas proposes a system of cosmopolitan harmonization rather than administrative institutional consolidation. 64 According to Habermas, unlike the nation-state or the regional polity, a global political structure could not provide a strong enough basis in civic solidarity necessary to support the legitimacy conditions of an adequate social policy. In order to inspire the sense of collective identity necessary for the constitution of solidarity, a political community needs to distinguish between members and non-members, defining the group, and identifying the relevant shared history. A cosmopolitan community of world citizens, by definition, has no outside; all people are members. It ' cannot inspire the "ethical-political self-understanding of citizens" necessary for the cultivation of civic solidarity (PC 108). It cannot constitute the ethos of a shared way of life. Thus, Habermas argues, if there were to be an extension of policies of redistribution beyond the nation-state, it would have to occur at the level of regional polities like the EU in conjunction with civil society actors and international institutions, rather than in a comprehensive World State.
However, Habermas clearly seeks an international system regulated by more than the inconsistencies of transnational power politics and generalized commitments to human rights. In reflecting on Kant's Perpetual Peace with "the benefit of two hundred years' hindsight," Habermas argues that to be effective cosmopolitan law must have force:
Cosmopolitan law must be institutionalized in such a way that it is binding on the individual governments. The community of peoples must be able to ensure that its members act at least in conformity with the law through the threat of sanctions .... 65 The point of cosmopolitan law is ... that it bypasses the collective subjects of international law and directly establishes the legal status of the individual subjects by granting them unmediated membership in the association of free and equal world citizens. 66 At its best, for Habermas, the present is a transition between the Westphalian system of nation-states and a future decentered cosmopolitan legal order characterized by the broad acceptance of human rights and a transnational commitment
